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Claire M. Gillan, Sharon Morein-Zamir, Gonzalo P. Urcelay, Akeem Sule, Valerie Voon,
Annemieke M. Apergis-Schoute, Naomi A. Fineberg, Barbara J. Sahakian, and
Trevor W. RobbinsBackground: Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric condition that typically manifests in compulsive urges to perform
irrational or excessive avoidance behaviors. A recent account has suggested that compulsivity in OCD might arise from excessive
stimulus-response habit formation, rendering behavior insensitive to goal value. We tested if OCD patients have a bias toward habits
using a novel shock avoidance task. To explore how habits, as a putative model of compulsivity, might relate to obsessions and anxiety,
we recorded measures of contingency knowledge, explicit fear, and physiological arousal.
Methods: Twenty-five OCD patients and 25 control subjects completed a shock avoidance task designed to induce habits through
overtraining, which were identified using goal-devaluation. The relationship between habitual behavior, erroneous cognitions, and
physiological arousal was assessed using behavior, questionnaires, subjective report, and skin conductance responses.
Results: A devaluation sensitivity test revealed that both groups could inhibit unnecessary behavioral responses before overtraining.
Following overtraining, OCD patients showed greater avoidance habits than control subjects. Groups did not differ in conditioned
arousal (skin conductance responses) at any stage. Additionally, groups did not differ in contingency knowledge or explicit ratings of
shock expectancy following the habit test. Habit responses were associated with a subjective urge to respond.
Conclusions: These data indicate that OCD patients have a tendency to develop excessive avoidance habits, providing support for a
habit account of OCD. Future research is needed to fully characterize the causal role of physiological arousal and explicit fear in habit
formation in OCD.Key Words: Avoidance, cognitive neuroscience, goal-directed
learning, habit, obsessive-compulsive disorder, psychophysiology
O
bsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a paradox. In
severe cases, patients spend most of their waking hours
performing repetitive compulsive behaviors and strug-
gling with disturbing obsessive thoughts and/or anxiety (1). But
patients with OCD are not deluded; most recognize that their
concerns are unrealistic and that their behavior is absurd or at
least excessive (2). Researchers have thus far struggled to explain
this ego-dystonic phenomenon: how a patient’s life can be taken
over, for example, by an overwhelming compulsion to repeatedly
flick a light switch, despite knowing that this action serves no real
purpose.
In healthy humans, prolonged repetition of behavior instills
habits, causing us to respond automatically under certain
environmental situations, regardless of whether or not these
actions produce useful outcomes (3). Although there is now a
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(as defined by the criterion of goal devaluation) can be formed in
avoidance in healthy humans or nonhuman animals. Previous
research suggests that OCD patients have a bias toward appe-
titive habit formation at the expense of goal-directed behavior,
an imbalance that might contribute to the repetitive and
seemingly senseless compulsions that exemplify the disorder
(4). However, compulsions in OCD are avoidant rather than
appetitive; therefore, if aberrant habit formation contributes to
this symptom, excessive avoidance habits should be experimen-
tally demonstrable in OCD.
We used a shock avoidance paradigm wherein subjects could
avoid receiving electric shocks by responding on the correct foot
pedal in response to warning stimuli (Figure 1A). Following
overtraining, we tested for habit formation using an instructed
outcome devaluation procedure whereby we disconnected one
of the subjects’ wrists from its stimulator (devalued), while
leaving the other connected (valued) (Figure 1B), and measured
the number of unnecessary avoidance responses to the now safe,
devalued stimulus. By using an avoidance paradigm, it was
possible to explore a number of functional predictions regarding
the putative role of habits in the obsessive-compulsive cycle.
One of the longest standing accounts of OCD symptomatol-
ogy is that compulsions are not habits but rather are rational
avoidance responses triggered by irrational beliefs (5–7). Irra-
tional beliefs are considered the product of cognitive bias in
OCD, including, for example, the overestimation of threat (8),
increased personal responsibility (5), and thought-action fusion
(7). These beliefs are thought by some to form the basis of
obsession and, in turn, anxiety in OCD, to which compulsions are
a goal-directed avoidance response (9). In this experiment, we
tested one possibility inspired by this account: that excessive
behavioral repetition in OCD (4) might not be evidence for habit
formation but rather is driven by a failure to learn about safety.BIOL PSYCHIATRY 2014;75:631–638
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Figure. 1. Task design. (A) Warning stimuli. The blue stimulus predicts a right shock, the red stimulus a left shock. If the correct avoidance response (e.g.,
left pedal to avoid left shock) is produced on time, subjects avoid shock. (B) Devaluation procedure. The electrodes on one side are disconnected from
their connector (devalued), and the electrodes on the other side are unchanged (valued).
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to assess if OCD patients exhibit a general failure to learn that what
was once dangerous is now safe. Moreover, we recorded levels of
self-report shock expectancy following the habit test to determine
if responding could be defined as habitual, i.e., was evident in spite
of low expectancy of shock. In addition to these two tests of safety
learning, we used questionnaires to test explicit knowledge of task
contingencies. This allowed us to test if a cognitive, specifically an
instrumental learning, deficit in the OCD group might better
explain habit-like responding in spite of outcome devaluation.
Beyond irrational belief, conditioned fear and anxiety are also
thought to be important for OCD (10) and indeed can bias
healthy individuals to behave habitually (11,12). To test if OCD
patients showed stronger conditioned arousal to warning stimuli
during the devaluation test and whether this might cause
overactive habit formation, we recorded skin conductance
responses (SCRs) throughout the experiment. We predicted that
OCD patients would be no more fearful of the conditioned
stimuli than control subjects and that their behavioral habits
would not be mediated by any such difference.
After the experiment, we recorded subjective accounts of why
participants felt compelled to respond to the devalued stimulus
during the critical habit test. Finally, to assess the ecological
validity of overactive habit formation as a model of compulsivity,
we asked subjects to rate the experiential urge to respond to the
devalued stimulus in our critical habit test. If habits are more than
just action slips, subjects should not only perform them following
overtraining but also feel compelled to do so.Table 1. Demographic Information
Measures Control Subjects OCD P
Age 41.04 (13.22) 40.6
Years in Education 16.4 (2.19) 15
NART 36 (7.31) 34.88
Y-BOCS 0 22.76
MADRS .96 (3) 6.6
STAI-State 30.16 (5.83) 44
STAI-Trait 32.44 (7.33) 60
OCI-R Total 8.68 (8.4) 33.16
CPAS 3.08 (3.81) 10.28
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
CPAS, Compulsive Personality Assessment Scale; MADRS, Mo
Adult Reading Test; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; OCI-R
Trait Anxiety Inventory (39); Y-BOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive Com
www.sobp.org/journalThe primary hypothesis of this study was that OCD patients
would show more behavioral habits than healthy control subjects
following overtraining and these habits would be associated with
a subjective urge to perform them. The secondary hypotheses
were 1) both groups would show similar general sensitivity to
devaluation (before overtraining), contingency knowledge, and
shock expectancy following devaluation between groups; and 2)
skin conductance responses, a putative proxy for physiological
fear, would not differ between groups.
Methods and Materials
Twenty-Five OCD patients (11 male patients) and 25 healthy
control subjects (11 male subjects) matched for age, IQ, handed-
ness (left handed: four OCD patients, five control subjects), and
years in education participated in this study (Table 1). Control
subjects were recruited from the community, were unmedicated,
and had never suffered from a psychiatric disorder. Obsessive-
compulsive disorder patients were screened by a psychiatrist
using an extended clinical interview to ensure they met the DSM-
IV-Text Revision criteria for OCD, exceeding 12 on the Yale-Brown
Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) (13), and had no comorbid
psychiatric disorders, past or present. The only exceptions to this
were two patients who had been previously diagnosed with
depression and one patient who had prior alcohol dependence.
We did not screen subjects for Axis II personality disorders, save
for obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD), which was
assessed using the Compulsive Personality Assessment Scale (14).atients t df p
(13.45) .127 1,48 .899
(3.04) 1.865 1,48 .068
(7.14) .548 1,48 .587
(5.27)
(3.7) 5.875 1,48 .001
(9.03) 6.437 1,48 .001
(8.67) 12.140 1,48 .001
(11.22) 8.733 1,48 .001
(6.13) 4.991 1,48 .001
ntgomery-A˚sberg Depression Rating Scale; NART, National
, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (40); STAI, State-
pulsive Scale.
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complaint. General exclusion criteria for both OCD patients and
control subjects were current substance dependence, head injury,
and current depression, indexed by scores exceeding 16 on the
Montgomery-A˚sberg Depression Rating Scale (15). Obsessive-
compulsive disorder patients reported higher levels of depressive
symptoms (though below clinical threshold), OCPD symptoms, and
anxiety (Table 1). Eighteen patients were medicated (7 unmedicated;
11 selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor [SSRI]/serotonin reuptake
inhibitor; 4 SSRI  antipsychotic; 1 SSRI  lithium bicarbonate; 1
SSRI  propranolol; 1 agomelatine). This study was approved by
Cambridgeshire 2 Research Ethics Committee (10/H0308/27).
Procedure
After obtaining informed consent, participants were fitted with
SCR and electrical stimulation electrodes. After the 5-minute SCR
settling-in period, subjects completed a standard electric shock
work-up procedure to reach a shock level that was unpleasant or
annoying but not painful for each wrist. Conditioned stimuli (CS)
were colored rectangles presented for 750 milliseconds. Two were
warning stimuli that predicted shock to the left and right wrists
respectively (CS1, CS2), and a third CS was safe, never
predicting shock (CS3). To avoid shock, subjects were required
to respond on foot pedals while a CS was on the screen. The left
pedal could avoid the shock to the left wrist, and likewise the
right pedal could avoid the shock to the right wrist (Figure 1A).
Correct avoidance responses cancelled an imminent shock but did
not terminate the CS. If the participant pressed the incorrect
pedal to a CS or failed to respond within 750 milliseconds, they
received a shock. If participants responded to the safe CS (CS3),
nothing happened; this was always safe. Intertrial intervals were 8
seconds, and the interval between stimulus termination and shock
delivery varied randomly between 350 and 600 milliseconds. To
eliminate SCR interference, behavioral responses (by foot) were
recorded distally from the site of SCR recording (finger tips).
Conditioned stimulus presentation order was randomized and
color counterbalanced across participants. Subjects were informed
that their task in the entire experiment was to avoid receiving
shocks. They were first presented with a Pavlovian demonstration
of the stimulus-outcome contingencies (Table 2). Subjects were
then instructed that they could avoid subsequent shocks by
performing the correct avoidance response while the stimulus
was on the screen. There were six avoidance practice trials before
the experiment began (two per CS) (Table 2). The main task
design consisted of four stages: a brief training session (3 trials per
CS), a devaluation test in extinction (4 trials per CS) (devaluation
sensitivity test), an extended training session (30 trials per CS), and
a final devaluation test in extinction (4 trials per CS) (habit test)
(Table 2). Shock outcomes were devalued by disconnecting theTable 2. Trial Sequence
Task Stage CS1 CS2 CS3
Pavlovian Exposure 1 1 1
Practice 2 2 2
Brief Training 3 3 3
Sensitivity to Devaluation Test 4 4 4
Extended Training 30 30 30
Habit Test 4 4 4
The number of trials in which the two warning stimuli (CS1 and
CS2) and the safe stimulus (CS3) were presented over the task
stages.
CS1, CS2, warning stimuli; CS3, safe stimulus.stimulator from the electrodes attached to one of the subjects’
wrists in full view of the participants. The electrodes attached to
the subjects’ other wrists remained connected to the other
stimulator and was thus valued (Figure 1B). Subjects were informed
that they could no longer be shocked to the wrist that was
disconnected and that their only task was to avoid receiving the
remaining shock. Devaluation was conducted in extinction to
control for additional reinforcement learning. Subjects behaving
in a goal-directed manner should not respond to the CS that
predicted the devalued outcome but maintain responding to avoid
the valued outcome. In the habit test, the alternate wrist to that
devalued during the devaluation sensitivity test was then
devalued. The devaluation procedure was counterbalanced across
subjects for left and right wrists. Half of the subjects had their left
wrist devalued first, and the other half had their right wrist
devalued first.
Following the behavioral experiment, subjects were tested on
their explicit knowledge of stimulus-action-outcome associations
experienced during training. Subjects also retrospectively rated
visual analogue scales from 0 to 100 probing 1) their level of
expectancy that a shock would follow the devalued CS; 2) the
extent to which they experienced an urge to continue respond-
ing in spite of the devaluation; and 3) the extent to which they
actively attempted to suppress this urge during the extinction
test. Finally, we asked subjects to report why they continued to
respond in the habit test or felt compelled to continue do so,
even when they did not actually respond.
Data Analysis
Data were statistically analyzed using analysis of variance,
Mann-Whitney U, chi-square, and Spearman’s rho. When correla-
tions were conducted between clinical scales and task perform-
ance, only the 25 OCD patients were included. Skin conductance
responses were measured using a Biopac system operating
AcqKnowledge 4.1 (MP36R, Biopac Systems, Santa Barbara,
California), sampling at 1000 Hz. Skin conductance responses
were identified as the peak responses .5 to 4.5 seconds from
stimulus onset, using 2 seconds before stimulus onset as base-
line. Skin conductance responses were subject to a .02 umho
threshold, and SCRs less than 5% of the max were excluded.
Individual SCRs were z-transformed using the average and
standard deviation of each subject’s SCRs over the entire experi-
ment. No SCRs were detected in five subjects who were excluded
from SCR analysis as nonresponders. Additionally, SCR data from
1 OCD patient was lost due to a recording error, leaving 21 OCD
patients and 23 control subjects for skin conductance analysis.
The behavioral data and questionnaire analysis included all 50
participants. Analysis of behavior and skin conductance responses
to the warning stimuli used the average responses to the two CS
over both training periods combined (brief and extended training:
6  60 ¼ 66 trials; Table 2). Analysis of false alarms to the
CS likewise used the average responses across both training
stages (i.e., 33 trials).Results
Behavior
There was no difference between groups in proficiency of task
performance, as reflected by equivalent response accuracy to the
warning stimuli, F1,48 ¼ 1.004, p ¼ .321 (Figure 2A), false alarms
to safe stimulus, and overall reaction times, Fs  1 (Figure 2C). In
the devaluation sensitivity test, before overtraining, both groupswww.sobp.org/journal
Figure 2. Training accuracy and general devaluation sensitivity. Error bars denote SEM. (A, B) Discriminative avoidance learning from training sessions.
There were no group differences in total avoidance performance or skin conductance responses (SCRs) to warning stimuli. (C, D) Rate of false alarm
responses and SCRs to safe stimulus did not differ between groups. (E, F) Devaluation sensitivity test. There were no differences in behavioral or
physiological (SCR) sensitivity to devaluation. CS, conditioned stimulus; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder.
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F1,48 ¼ 200.08, p  .001 (Figure 2E). There was no difference
between groups or group by stimulus interaction, F  1, indicat-
ing that OCD patients were unimpaired in their ability to learn
about the safety of the devalued stimulus and withhold unneces-
sary responses accordingly.
In the habit test, following overtraining, although both groups
showed a strong devaluation effect, OCD patients showed
greater stimulus-response habit learning than control subjects
(Figure 3A), evidenced by greater avoidance of a stimulus that
was no longer predictive of shock (devalued). There was a
significant main effect of group and a group-by-stimulus inter-
action, both F1,48 ¼ 4.725, p ¼ .035. These effects were driven by
the persistent responding to the devalued stimulus by OCDwww.sobp.org/journalpatients (mean ¼ .84, SE ¼ .25) compared with control subjects
(mean ¼ .16, SE ¼ .12), F1,48 ¼ 5.695, p ¼ .021. Responses to the
valued stimulus did not differ between groups (OCD: mean ¼ 3.8,
SE ¼ .08; control subjects: mean ¼ 3.8, SE ¼ .1). Overall, there was
greater responding to the valued compared with the devalued
stimulus, indicating that there was a significant devaluation effect
in both groups, F1,48 ¼ 445.095, p  .001. The majority of subjects
did not continue to respond in the habit test, with just nine OCD
patients and two control subjects making any responses. Given
that responses were not normally distributed, we conducted a
Mann-Whitney U test to confirm the results of our analysis of
variance using a nonparametric test. This confirmed that relative
to control subjects, OCD patients responded more to the
devalued stimulus (U50 ¼ 223.5, z ¼ 2.384, p ¼ .017) and there
Figure 3. Habits in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients. Error bars denote SEM. (A) Habit test. Behavioral responses made to the valued
stimulus did not differ, F  1, but OCD patients responded significantly more to the stimulus that explicitly no longer predicted shock (devalued) than
control subjects. (B) Skin conductance response (SCR) of OCD patients and control subjects during critical habit test did not differ. (C) Obsessive-
compulsive disorder patients reported a significantly stronger urge to make avoidance responses in spite of devaluation, F1,48 ¼ 7.016, p ¼ .011. (D) No
group difference in explicit shock expectancy in light of the devaluation procedure. *Significant at p  .05. CS, conditioned stimulus.
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302.5, z ¼ .291, p ¼ .771). A chi-square test confirmed that more
individuals in the OCD group responded during the habit test
(w21 ¼ 5.71, p ¼ .017).
The rate of habitual responding in OCD patients correlated
marginally with overall Y-BOCS scores, r ¼ .357, p ¼ .08. This
was driven by the obsessions subscale on the Y-BOCS r ¼ .397,
p ¼ .049, and not the compulsions subscale, r ¼ .102, p ¼ .627.
Other nonsignificant trends in positive correlations existed
between habit responses and the Obsessive-Compulsive Inven-
tory-Revised obsessions (r ¼ .357, p ¼ .08) and hoarding (r ¼
.387, p ¼ .056) subscales and state anxiety, r ¼ .352, p ¼ .084.
There was no significant correlation between habit responses
and trait anxiety, r ¼ .11, p ¼ .602, or OCPD symptoms
(Compulsive Personality Assessment Scale scores), r ¼ .061,
p ¼ .771. As only a subset of OCD patients continued to
respond in the habit test, we compared OCD patients who
responded and those who did not. We found no significant
differences in any of the clinical variables recorded, including
symptom subtypes. Finally, as many patients were medicated,
we tested for differences between medicated and unmedicated
patient responses to the devalued stimulus. Although we found
no difference (Fs  1), given the small sample size (unmedicated7, medicated 18), this does not eliminate the possibility of a
medication effect.
Skin Conductance
The behavioral data discussed in this section pertain only to
subjects for whom SCR data could be analyzed. Nevertheless, the
main results remain significant in this smaller subset (e.g.,
stimulus-by-group interaction: F1,42 ¼ 5.224, p ¼ .027). To test
if habitual responding in the OCD group was the result of
heightened conditioned arousal to threatening stimuli or general
arousal in response to stimulus presentation (SCRs to the safe
stimulus), we compared SCRs between groups during training.
There was no difference in SCRs between OCD (mean ¼ .374,
SE ¼ .098) and control subjects (mean ¼ .574, SE ¼ .104) to the
warning stimuli, F1,42 ¼ 1.96, p ¼ .169 (Figure 2B), or to the safe
stimulus, F  1, (OCD: mean ¼ .535, SE ¼ .068; control subjects:
mean ¼ .493, SE ¼ .081) (Figure 2D). We also compared SCRs
during our two extinction tests to assess whether our OCD habit
effect was caused by a failure to decrease (extinguish) condi-
tioned arousal in light of devaluation. The data obtained during
these tests were highly variable given the low number of trials,
and therefore these results should be interpreted with caution.
There was no difference in overall SCR between OCD patientswww.sobp.org/journal
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SE ¼ .117) in the devaluation sensitivity test, F1,42 ¼ 1.29, p ¼
.263, or in the habit test (OCD: mean ¼ .219, SE ¼ .158; control
subjects: mean ¼ .189, SE ¼ .116), F  1, nor were there any
interactions between group and CS type, Fs  1. In the devalua-
tion sensitivity test, both groups exhibited greater SCRs to the
valued relative to the devalued CS, F1,42 ¼ 10.27, p ¼ .003
(Figure 2F). However, in the habit test, following extended
training, the main effect of stimulus (i.e., the difference between
the valued and devalued CS) was not significant, F  1
(Figure 3B). In the habit test, there was no significant correlation
between OCD patients’ SCRs to the devalued CS and the number
of behavioral responses they made toward that CS, r21 ¼ .248,
p ¼ .279.
Explicit Knowledge
To test if the observed difference in sensitivity to devaluation
following extended training was the result of impairments in
contingency knowledge in the OCD group, we tested subjects’
awareness of explicit associative contingencies. We found no
difference between OCD patients and control subjects in their
knowledge of the response (OCD: 100% accuracy; control
subjects: mean ¼ 98.7%, SE ¼ 1.3), F1,48 ¼ 1, p ¼ .322, or
outcome (OCD: 96%, SE ¼ 4; control subjects: 98.7%, SE ¼ 1.3),
F  1, contingencies from the task. Likewise, there were no
group differences in post hoc ratings of shock expectancy
following devaluation, F1,48 ¼ 1.371, p ¼ .247 (Figure 3D),
indicating that our devaluation procedure had been equally
effective in both groups (also see behavior in devaluation
sensitivity test).
Additional Assessments
Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients reported experiencing
a more intense premonitory urge to perform unnecessary
habitual foot presses than control subjects, F1,48 ¼ 7.016, p ¼
.011 (Figure 3C). This intensity of urge correlated with the
number of responses made to the devalued stimulus in the
habit test by the OCD group, r25 ¼ .528, p ¼ .007. Patients who
responded to the devalued stimulus in the habit test reported a
greater urge than those who did not, F1,23 ¼ 8.706, p ¼ .007.
Some subjects, two control subjects and eight OCD patients, who
experienced an urge to respond, reported that they attempted to
suppress it during the test. Of these two control subjects, both
successfully suppressed their responses. Of the eight OCD
patients who attempted to suppress responses, six were suc-
cessful and two were not. Post hoc explanations for responding
to the devalued stimulus manifested primarily as irrational threat
beliefs in OCD patients, e.g., “I thought I might still be shocked”
(Table 3). Like obsessions in OCD, these beliefs were in many
cases directly ego-dystonic or contradictory to the patients’Table 3. Subjective Accounts for Urge to Perform Habits in OCD Patients an
Subjective Accounts OCD
Threat Beliefs (“I thought it could still shock me”) 9
Accidental Slips (“I lost concentration”) 6
Other 1
NA 9
Comments are from all subjects who responded on either pedal (correct o
stimulus in the habit test.
NA, not applicable; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder.
www.sobp.org/journalexplicit knowledge of task contingency and their ratings of shock
expectancy taken moments earlier.Discussion
This study is the first experimental demonstration of habits in
avoidance using the goal devaluation procedure. We observed
that OCD patients have a bias toward developing avoidance
habits and that these habits are related to a subjective urge to
respond. These results are consistent with prior reports of
impaired goal-directed learning in OCD during appetitive instru-
mental learning (4) and economic choice (16). Avoidance habits
were not the result of any measurable differences in contingency
knowledge, explicit threat appraisal, or physiological arousal,
suggesting that habits might be an independent contributor to
the disorder. The observation that habits were associated with a
subjective urge to respond is novel and suggests that habits can,
at times, manifest as more than just accidental slips. This finding
lends further support to the habit hypothesis of OCD (17,18).
We investigated the notion that excessive responding in OCD
patients is due to a failure to adjust (i.e., devalue) goal-directed
behavior, rather than indicative of stimulus-response habit. To
test this, we examined sensitivity to a shock devaluation
manipulation before overtraining. We found no difference in
behavior between the groups in this test, suggesting that before
overtraining, OCD patients and control subjects alike believed
that the devalued stimulus was safe and were capable of
updating their behavioral responses accordingly. This finding
was corroborated by the ratings of shock expectancy taken after
the habit test, wherein both groups reported very low expect-
ancy. Together, these data indicate that responses to the
devalued stimulus in the OCD group are indicative of habit and
cannot be construed as goal-directed, purposeful avoidance.
Milad and Rauch (10) recently proposed that OCD may be
associated with failures in conditioned fear extinction, noting that
although this is not a sufficient account of the phenomenology
of OCD, such an impairment could likely be involved in main-
taining compulsions. Consistent with this view, anxiety is thought
to induce habits by biasing cognitive control systems toward
salient stimuli and away from goal-directed actions (12).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients showed no difference
in physiological conditioning or extinction following outcome
devaluation, and SCRs were not predictive of habit responses.
Therefore, a simple stress-habit account does not appear to
explain the excessive behavioral habits observed in the OCD
group in this study. However, this finding does not rule out the
possibility that stress or anxiety mediated the habit responses
observed. The SCR data acquired during our habit test was
particularly variable and caution should be taken whend Control Subjects
n of Cases
Control w2 p
2 5.71 .017
3 1.22 .269
2 .355 .552
17 5.128 .024
r incorrect) or felt an urge to respond when presented with the devalued
C.M. Gillan et al. BIOL PSYCHIATRY 2014;75:631–638 637interpreting a null result. Future research should address this
question using a paradigm that can fully (e.g., temporally)
disambiguate Pavlovian fear responses from instrumental
responding.
Previous studies have shown that OCD is also associated with
deficits in general response inhibition (19,20), abnormal orbito-
frontal cortex activation during reversal learning (21), and switch-
ing between rules (extradimensional set-shifting) (22), findings
that are consistent with the results of the present study. The
overreliance on avoidance habits observed in this study takes
these findings concerning behavioral flexibility a step forward,
revealing that apparent inhibitory failures emerge over time and
with repetition. Furthermore, these data offer a means of
explaining the ego-dystonic nature of OCD symptoms, i.e.,
stimuli, rather than goals, control behavior. Apparently dis-
congruent with our prediction, however, habit responding did
not correlate with the compulsions subscale of the Y-BOCS but
did correlate marginally with obsessions. Future research should
investigate this and would perhaps have greater success in
characterizing the relationship between habit, compulsions, and
obsessions by adopting a continuous test (23), rather than using
outcome devaluation.
Finally, we recorded subjective accounts of why subjects
either continued to respond or felt compelled to do so (but
did not actually make the response) when presented with the
devalued stimulus. This exploratory measure revealed OCD
patients and control subjects reported post hoc irrational threat
beliefs pertaining to the devaluation. It was particularly striking
that these threat beliefs emerged in spite of the earlier experi-
ence of safety following devaluation in the devaluation sensitivity
test and were in stark contrast to explicit ratings of shock
expectancy taken moments before this subjective account. We
speculate that experiencing an urge to perform, or performing,
irrational avoidance habits could potentially reinforce, or even
engender, irrational fear. In situations of cognitive dissonance,
where behavior contradicts belief, humans are known to alter
beliefs to match behavior (24). Within this framework, irrational
obsessive thoughts in OCD might function to resolve the internal
conflict arising from experiencing an otherwise nonsensical urge to
avoid. However, it may be ultimately impossible to disentangle
irrational beliefs from habit behavior, as these features might
concurrently strengthen over time (e.g., as cognitive habits). As our
task was not optimized to assess the development of irrational beliefs
and only a subset of subjects reported these threat-related beliefs,
future studies will be necessary to directly test these proposals.
The neural circuits underlying the balance between habitual
and goal-directed behavior have been well defined in the neuro-
science literature, overlapping with the frontostriatal circuits
known to be involved in OCD (25–27). Although this study
provides evidence for overactive habit formation in OCD, it does
not resolve the issue of whether deficient inhibitory process in
frontal regions mediate this effect (from the top down) (28,29) or
whether overactive habit formation is, in fact, mediated in the
striatum (bottom up), where goal-directed actions and habits are
subserved by the caudate nucleus and the putamen, respectively
(30–33). Future neuroimaging studies should address this question.
That most patients were medicated with SSRIs poses a limitation
for this study. However, analysis comparing medicated and unme-
dicated patients revealed no effect of medication status on habit
formation. Nonetheless, such a comparison is limited, given the low
number of unmedicated patients, and therefore future studies
should test their role in habit formation directly. To date, no research
in humans has directly assessed the role of serotonin in habitformation, but work in animals has shown decreased sensitivity to
outcome devaluation as a result of serotonin receptor antagonism or
serotonin depletion (34,35). It therefore would appear unlikely that
chronic SSRIs themselves would enhance habit formation.
This notion that excessive habit formation may be a contributor
to OCD is consistent with recent data suggesting that compulsivity
might play a more prominent role in OCD than previously assumed
(36). These data are compatible with a possible shift in the
classification of OCD as an anxiety disorder in the forthcoming
issue of the DSM (37) and have implications for the development
of new behavioral and pharmacologic interventions focusing on
suppressing habits. Furthermore, understanding how the urge to
perform habits might contribute to compulsive urge in OCD may
offer a new insight of immediate clinical value not only to the
cognitive-behavioral treatment of the OCD but also potentially to
other disorders of maladaptive habit formation, such as drug
addiction (38).
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